Abstract
Introduction
The complexity of developing fault-tolerant systems is, in part, due to the crosscutting and evolving nature of faulttolerance requirements. Since it is difficult to anticipate all types of faults 2 at early stages of development, it is better to have techniques that enable existing analysis artifacts to be revised once a new type of fault is detected. Such a revision would potentially crosscut all components of the conceptual model of an existing system. As such, developers need rigorous techniques and reusable artifacts for adding faulttolerance concerns to conceptual models. This paper introduces a pattern-based approach for adding failsafe faulttolerance to an existing conceptual model (in UML [7] ), where a failsafe fault-tolerant system is expected to meet its safety requirements even when faults occur.
Numerous approaches exist to support fault-tolerance [1, 5, 14, 30, 32, 33] and to analyze system safety in the presence of failures [6, 23, 27 ], most of which (i) rely on a specific fault-tolerance design/implementation mechanism; (ii) do not emphasize on reuse in analysis phases, and (iii) lack sufficient support for formal analysis of the potential interferences between fault-tolerance and functional concerns. For example, Saridakis [32] presents a set of design patterns based on existing recovery mechanisms [14, 30] . Bondavalli et al. [6] translate UML structural and behavioral diagrams to Stochastic Petri Nets in order to provide quantitative predictions for system dependability/reliability. Leveson and Stolzy [27] present a formal framework based on Timed Petri Nets to model and analyze fault-tolerance in real-time systems. The UML profile for fault-tolerance [1] and several aspect-oriented approaches [18, 34] use redundancy of services [33] to mask faults, which is sometimes impractical and costly [2] . Approaches based on safety cases [23] present a framework for goal-based failure analysis and systematic specification of lessons and recommendations for post-failure corrections of safety-critical systems. Furthermore, some existing analysis methods for fault-tolerance [22, 31] assume that a specific fault-tolerance design mechanism (e.g., exception handling, redundancy) will be used and specify analysis requirements within those design constraints, which may overly constrain and preclude useful fault-tolerance solutions. (For example, it is difficult to specify and model self-stabilization [9] solely based on exception handling.) While all aforementioned approaches present useful and important techniques for modeling and analyzing fault-tolerance concerns, three important features distinguish our approach from existing work: (1) providing reusable modeling artifacts for incremental modeling of fault-tolerance; (2) ensuring the fault-tolerance of the modeling elements added for fault-tolerance purposes, and (3) facilitating automated reasoning (coupled with visualization) in analyzing the mutual impact of fault-tolerance and functional concerns.
We introduce an object analysis pattern, called the detector pattern, that provides a reusable strategy for eliciting and specifying the requirements of error detection in UML object models for embedded systems. Our focus on capturing error detection requirements is an extension of Arora and Kulkarni's [3] results where they show that detection is necessary and sufficient for developing a rich class of failsafe fault-tolerant systems. As such, the detector pattern is intended to provide a generic artifact in model-driven development of failsafe systems. Object analysis patterns apply a similar approach to that used by design patterns [19] , but instead of focusing on design they address the construction of the conceptual model of a system [10] . Patterns for the analysis stage of software development are not new (see [17, 24] ). For example, Fowler [17] presents a method for characterizing recurring ideas in business modeling as reusable analysis patterns. Konrad et al. [24] present domain-specific object analysis patterns for analyzing the conceptual models of embedded systems. The proposed detector pattern in this paper provides a reusable building block for the construction of the conceptual models of failsafe systems.
Our pattern-based method comprises fault modeling, fault-tolerance modeling, and automated analysis of the UML models of fault-tolerant embedded systems. Specifically, to construct the UML model of a Fault-Tolerant System (FTS), we start with the UML model of its faultintolerant version, where a Fault-Intolerant System (FIS) meets its functional requirements in the absence of faults (i.e., when no faults occur) and provides no guarantees in the presence of faults (i.e., when faults occur). Then we model faults in the UML model of the FIS to produce a model with faults. We use the notion of state perturbation to model different types of faults in UML state diagrams [2, 9] . Next, we specify error states that are reached due to the occurrence of faults. Subsequently, we add instances of the detector pattern to the model with faults to capture the requirements of error detection and to generate a candidate UML model of a failsafe FTS. To create a valid UML model of the failsafe FTS, we have to ensure that the candidate UML model is interference-free. That is, in the absence of faults, the candidate model meets all functional requirements of the FIS, and in the presence of faults, the candidate model at least meets the safety requirements of the FIS and the instances of the detector pattern. To ensure interferencefreedom, we extend McUmber and Cheng's formalization framework [28] to generate formal specifications of faults, fault-tolerance and functional concerns in the Promela modeling language [21] . Subsequently, we use the Spin model checker [21] to detect inconsistencies between the detector pattern instances and the functional model of the FIS. The automated analysis with the Spin model checker coupled with a new visualization tool, called Theseus [20] , that animates counterexample traces enables a roundtrip engineering process for modeling and analyzing failsafe FTSs.
We demonstrate our approach by modeling and analyzing an adaptive cruise control (ACC) system in UML. We have also validated our approach for several other examples from industry [12] , including a diesel filter system for reducing soot from diesel truck exhaust. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an approach to modeling faults in UML state diagrams. Section 3 discusses the relation between failsafe fault-tolerance and error detection. Section 4 presents the detector pattern. Section 5 focuses on formal analysis of UML models of FTSs using Spin [21] . Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks and discusses future work.
Modeling
In this section, we present the basic concepts of modeling FISs, faults, and failsafe fault-tolerance in UML. We reiterate the definitions of faults and fault-tolerance from [2] . The motivation behind using UML is two-fold. First, UML is the de facto standard for object-oriented modeling. Second, UML state diagrams enable us to capture any form of fault-tolerance that can be expressed in a state machinebased formalism.
UML Models.
We use conventional UML notations [7] to represent the UML-based conceptual models of FISs (respectively, FTSs). Since our focus is on modeling and analyzing fault-tolerant embedded systems, we follow Douglass [10] in using UML class diagrams to model structural constraints of (software and hardware components of) embedded systems during the object analysis phase. We use state diagrams to capture high-level behavioral information of UML object models. The combination of class and state diagrams yields an object analysis model.
Depending on the semantics of object interactions, the complexity of automatic analysis of a FTS varies from polynomial (in a shared memory model [25] ) to undecidable (in an asynchronous message-passing model [16] ). To facilitate an automated analysis method with a manageable complexity, in this paper, we consider a high atomicity model where transitions of UML state diagrams are executed atomically, and any instance of message passing between two objects takes place in an atomic step. Another motivation behind this assumption is that modeling fault-tolerance in a high atomicity model provides an impossibility test in early stages of development (which could potentially reduce development costs). That is, if a conceptual model of an FTS cannot be derived from the conceptual model of its faultintolerant version in the high atomicity model, then it would be impossible to derive a model of the FTS in a lower atomicity level.
is an object, we denote the state transition diagram of each 
Modeling Functional Requirements. We consider the set of functional requirements as a conjunction of a set of safety requirements and a set of liveness requirements. Intuitively, safety requirements stipulate that nothing bad ever happens, and the liveness requirements specify that something good will eventually occur in a finite amount of time. For example, in a cruise control system, the actual speed of the car must not exceed 1% of the desired speed set by the driver (i.e., safety), and when the driver applies the brakes, the cruise control system will eventually be deactivated (i.e., liveness). We represent safety requirements by a set of transitions, say B, that must not occur in the computations of any object. We do not explicitly specify liveness requirements, instead, since we want to derive a model of an FTS from a valid model of its faultintolerant version, we stipulate that during such transformations no deadlock states (states with no outgoing transitions) should be introduced in the absence of faults. The deadlock freedom requirement captures the fact that, in the absence of faults, fault-tolerant embedded systems have nonterminating computations and always react to their environment. We say a computation s 0 , s 1 , · · · meets safety requirements iff (if and only if) ∀i : Running Example: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC). The ACC system comprises a standard cruise control system and a radar system to control the distance between the car and the front vehicle, called the target vehicle. The ACC system has different modes of operation (see Figure  1 ), namely closing, coasting and matching. When the radar detects a target vehicle, the ACC system enters the closing mode. In the closing mode, the goal is to control the way that the car approaches the target vehicle, and to keep the car in a fixed trail distance from the target vehicle with a zero relative speed. The trail distance is the distance that the target vehicle travels in a fixed amount of time (e.g., 2 seconds). The distance to the target vehicle must not be less than a safety zone, which is 90% of the trail distance. The ACC system calculates a coasting distance that is the distance at which the car should start decelerating in order to achieve the trail distance; i.e., the car enters the coasting zone. When the car reaches the trail distance, the relative speed of the car should be zero; i.e., the ACC system is in the matching mode. The safety requirements of the ACC system state that the car is never in the safety zone and it will never accelerate in the coasting or matching modes. 
Modeling Faults in State Diagrams
We systematically model a fault-type as a set of transitions in UML state diagrams (see Figure 2) . Representing faults as a set of transitions has already appeared in previous work [2, 9] , and it is known that state perturbation is sufficiently expressive to represent different types of faults, such as crash, input-corruption and Byzantine, from different behavioral categories; i.e., transient, intermittent, permanent [2, 9] . To model a fault-type f in a UML model [25] . For example, in Figure 2 , all error states are only reachable when faults occur. Thus, modeling faults in a state diagram may introduce new states and transitions in that state diagram. A computation of an object that starts in its fault-span outside the set of normal states may lead to a failure scenario in which it may (i) violate safety requirements, (ii) fall into non-progress cycles, or (iii) reach a deadlock state. For example, in Figure 2 , if the object is in State1 then the faults f i may non-deterministically transition to ErrorState 1 from where the object may either be trapped in a non-progress cycle (comprising ErrorState 1 and ErrorState 2) or be deadlocked in ErrorState 5. Since manual identification of f ispan is a tedious task, we use our previously develop FaultTolerance Synthesizer (FTSyn) [13] to automatically generate the fault-span.
ACC Example: The object model of the ACC system includes three main objects, namely Control, Car and Radar (see Figure 5) . ( 
Failsafe Fault-Tolerance
Intuitively, failsafe fault-tolerance requires that nothing bad ever happens even in the presence of faults [2] . For a fault-type f and a UML model M of an FIS that is subject to f , we want to derive a UML model M from M such that M satisfies the following conditions: (1) in the absence of f , the set of computations of M is non-empty and is a subset of the set of computations of M , and (2) all computations of M , including the set of computations with faults f , meet safety requirements.
Necessity and Sufficiency of Detection
In this section, we intuitively explain the relation between error detection in the presence of faults and failsafe fault-tolerance. Specifically, to preserve safety requirements even if faults occur, a failsafe fault-tolerant system should ensure that none of its computations would reach a state from where faults may directly violate safety. Moreover, after faults perturb the state of a failsafe system outside its set of normal states, the system must not execute transitions that violate safety. To enable such functionalities, a failsafe system should be able to detect its current state and take necessary actions that will not lead to the violation of safety requirements. Hence, we define two categories of states that should be detected by a failsafe system, namely fault-unsafe and at-risk states. The set of fault-unsafe states, represented by a state predicate S unsaf e , captures the set of states in the fault-span from where a sequence of fault transitions alone may violate safety requirements. A failsafe FTS must never reach a state in S unsaf e . In the set of at-risk states, denoted as a state predicate S at−risk , a FIS itself may execute actions that violate safety requirements. (FTSyn [13] automatically identifies these state predicates.) For example, in the ACC system, a global state where the control is in the coasting mode and the car is in the Accelerating state is an at-risk state since the car may accelerate and violate the requirement of no acceleration while coasting. (A soundness proof of the above argument about necessity and sufficiency of detection for failsafe fault-tolerance can be found in [3, 25] .)
Detector Pattern
In this section, we introduce the detector pattern that we use to augment the FIS conceptual model to derive a conceptual model of a failsafe FTS while preserving the safety and liveness requirements of the FIS in the absence of faults. In order to facilitate its use, we define a template for the detector pattern based on the fields used in the design patterns presented by Gamma et al. [19] , with modifications to reflect analysis-level information. For example, we do not use the Implementation and Sample Code fields. The Structure field captures structural constraints of the detector pattern represented by UML class diagrams. The detector pattern also includes several new fields that are added for the purpose of specifying and analyzing fault-tolerance concerns. For example, the detector pattern includes the Detection Requirements field that specifies a set of requirements that must be met by the resulting UML model to guarantee that the detection occurs correctly. Next, we describe the fields of the detector pattern. Example application of each field to the ACC system is denoted in italics.
Detection Predicate.
In a UML model M = O 1 , · · · , O n , a detection predicate is a global/local state predicate. In a distributed system, it is difficult for an object to detect a global detection predicate X in an atomic step [29] . Thus, we decompose X into a set of local predicates X 1 , · · · , X n , and specify the detection of X based on the detection of X 1 , · · · , X n , where each X i is a local state predicate specified for object O i . Since the state predicate S unsaf e captures the local unsafe states of each object, S unsaf e is often specified as a conjunction of a set of local state predicates. For the same reason, S at−risk most often has a conjunctive form. Hence, we limit the scope of the application of the detector pattern to the detection of conjunctive predicates. Moreover, since embedded systems frequently detect the conditions of their underlying physical system, the corresponding conditions remain stable relative to the processing speed of the embedded computing system until the embedded system detects them and takes necessary actions. Hence, in this section, we focus on stable global predicates that once hold remain true until detected.
ACC Structure. The choice of the structure of the detector pattern depends on the inter-object associations in a UML object model. For example, if one needs to detect a global predicate over a set of functional objects that are associated with each other in a tree-like structure, then it is appropriate to use an instance of the detector pattern with a hierarchical (parallel) structure. Due to space constraints, we omit the presentation of sequential and compositional detector patterns (see [12] for details). In a parallel detector (see Figure  4) , the detection of X can be done in parallel, where all elements d i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, detect their detection predicates concurrently. The shadowed objects represent the elements of the detector pattern encapsulated in a dashed box that denotes an instance of the detector pattern. The distinguished element of the detector pattern is depicted by the dark shading. Each detector participant d i is associated with an object Figure 4 , the distinguished element is associated with all participants d i .
ACC Example: Figure 5 In order to ensure that the detection occurs correctly, the detector pattern should meet the following requirements (adapted from [3] ): (1) Safeness. It is never the case that the witness predicate Z is true when the detection predicate X is false; i.e., the detector pattern never lies. (2) Progress. It is always the case that if X is true then Z will eventually hold. (3) Stability. It is always the case that once Z becomes true, it will remain true as long as predicate X is true (i.e., Z remains stable). Each participant d i should also meet the above requirements for Z i and X i .
The safeness and stability are safety requirements that can be specified in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [15] using (i) the universal operator 2, where 2Y means that the state predicate Y always holds, and (ii) the next state operator , where Y means that in the next state Y holds. We respectively specify safeness and stability as 2(Z ⇒ X) and 2(Z ⇒ ( (Z ∨¬X)) ). Using the eventuality operator 3, where 3Y means that the state predicate Y eventually holds, we specify progress as 2(X ⇒ 3Z). Failsafe fault-tolerance of the Detector pattern. Since the instances of the detector pattern are also subject to faults, we ensure that the detector pattern is itself failsafe fault-tolerant. To this end, we verify that the composition of the UML model M of an FIS, and an instance of the detector pattern meet the following requirements: (1) In the absence of faults, the functional requirements of M are met (i.e., safety is not violated and no deadlock is reached), and (2) In the presence of faults, the safeness and the stability of the detector pattern and the safety requirements of M are satisfied. Note that when faults occur, the only requirement for a failsafe FTS is to preserve its safety requirements. Thus, the detector pattern need not meet its progress requirement when faults occur. For example, in the ACC example, if X ACC holds but Z ACC never becomes true, then safety requirements are still met since the Car object never accelerates if Z ACC is false. However, the liveness of the ACC system may be violated. Remark. While the ACC example is small, the number of the elements of an instance of the detector pattern cannot go beyond the number of system components. Moreover, even though composing an instance of the detector pattern with the functional model of an FIS may add a layer of complexity, the modularity provided by the detector pattern facilitates the management of such complexity. (Other patterndriven methods may also suffer from this additional layer of complexity introduced by pattern instantiation.)
Model Analysis
In order to verify whether composing an instance of the detector pattern with the conceptual model of a FIS generates a valid model of a failsafe system, we extend the Hydra formalization framework [28] to generate a Promela specification of a candidate UML model of an FTS. Subsequently, we use the Spin model checker [21] to detect potential inconsistencies between the instances of the detector pattern and the functional model of the FIS. The general UMLto-Promela formalization approach of Hydra is to map objects to processes in Spin that exchange messages via channels. Nested and concurrent states are also formalized as processes. Additional details on the modeling and analysis process, and the underlying formalization framework can be found in [28] . We use the current Hydra formalization directly to generate Promela specifications of the functional objects of the FIS and each d i element as a separate process.
We extend Hydra to include a number of new formalization rules that treat the transitions of a fault-type f differently than other transitions. As we distinguish fault transitions from regular transitions by defining a <<Fault>> stereotype [7] , the extended Hydra integrates the transitions of f modeled in different state diagrams in a separate process Fault f in Promela that is concurrently run with all other processes. Such a formalization is advantageous in that the resulting Promela model separates faults from the functional part of the Promela specifications so that the effect of faults on system behaviors can easily be simulated and analyzed.
We use Spin to simulate and verify the Promela specifications generated by Hydra. For example, while verifying the UML model of a FTS against detection requirements, we may find counterexamples that represent the inconsistencies of the detector pattern and the functional objects. To analyze such inconsistencies, we use Theseus [20] 
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced an object analysis pattern, called the detector pattern, for modeling and analyzing failsafe fault-tolerance, where instances of the detector pattern are added to the UML model of a system to create the UML model of its failsafe fault-tolerant version. The detector pattern also provides a set of constraints for verifying the consistency of functional and fault-tolerance requirements and the fault-tolerance of the detector pattern itself. We extended McUmber and Cheng's formalization framework [28] to generate formal specifications of the UML model of fault-tolerant systems in Promela [21] . Subsequently, we used the Spin model checker [21] to detect the inconsistencies between fault-tolerance and functional requirements. To facilitate the automated analysis of failsafe fault-tolerance, we employed the Theseus visualization tool [20] that animates counterexample traces and generates corresponding diagrams at the UML level. As an extension of this work, we are currently investigating the incorporation of timing issues in the detector pattern.
